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Abstract
It is widely believed that one should not become more confident that
all swans are white and all lions are brave simply by observing white
swans. Irrelevant conjunction or “tacking” of a theory onto another is of-
ten thought problematic for Bayesianism, especially given the ratio mea-
sure of confirmation considered here. It is recalled that the irrelevant
conjunct is not confirmed at all. Using the ratio measure, the irrelevant
conjunction is confirmed to the same degree as the relevant conjunct,
which, it is argued, is ideal: the irrelevant conjunct is irrelevant. Because
the past’s really having been as it now appears to have been is an irrele-
vant conjunct, present evidence confirms theories about past events only
insofar as irrelevant conjunctions are confirmed. Hence the ideal of not
confirming irrelevant conjunctions would imply that historical claims are
not confirmed. Confirmation measures partially realizing that ideal make
the confirmation of historical claims by present evidence depend strongly
on the (presumably subjective) degree of belief in the irrelevant conjunct.
The unusually good behavior of the ratio measure has a bearing on the
problem of measure sensitivity. For non-statistical hypotheses, Bayes’
theorem yields a fractional linear transformation in the prior probability,
not a linear rescaling, so even the ratio measure arguably does not aptly
measure confirmation in such cases.
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1 Introduction
The problem of irrelevant conjunction or “tacking” is often presented as a dif-
ficulty for Bayesian confirmation theory in general or for the ratio measure of
confirmation in particular. A number of authors find it evident that a theory T1
ought not to be evidence for the conjunction T1&T2 for an irrelevant conjunct
T2. If that desideratum is impossible, at least they want to reduce the damage
by having T1&T2 confirmed less than T1. Suppose that, if a definite example is
required, T1 is the claim that all swans are white, while T2 is the theory that all
lions are brave.1 The irrelevance is obvious: one cannot learn about the courage
of lions simply by studying the colors of swans. I take this sort of example to be
illuminating regarding what one means by irrelevant conjunction. Yet Bayesian
confirmation theory, with various measures of confirmation, including the ratio
measure, implies that observing white swans confirms T1&T2: one becomes more
confident that all swans are white and all lions are brave, simply by observing
white swans. Can one thereby become more confident that all lions are brave
by observing white swans? Obviously the right answer is “no.” Such a result
also follows, fortunately, from Bayesian confirmation theory. But is that enough
to resolve the worry, or is there some further problem about the conjunction’s
being confirmed?
Whether there is any problem of irrelevant conjunction depends largely on
one’s intuitions about measures of confirmation and about irrelevant conjunc-
tions. Some authors are attracted to the ratio measure, according to which
there is no problem of irrelevant conjunction. Irrelevant conjunctions are con-
firmed, indeed confirmed just as much as the relevant conjunct is, and that is
accepted as a result, not an absurdity. (Of course the posterior probabilities, like
the priors, are not equal in general, so absurdity isn’t obvious.) Other authors
are attracted to other measures of confirmation and hold that it is problematic
that irrelevant conjunctions are confirmed. The ideal for many such authors,
apparently, is that irrelevant conjunctions not be confirmed at all. That ideal
is incompatible with Bayesianism. Others wish for irrelevant conjunctions to
be confirmed, but less than is the relevant conjunct [Rosenkrantz, 1994]. Many
settle for this view who would have preferred the stronger ideal of no confirma-
tion.
The dialectical situation is a standoff. It is not the case that non-ratio
Bayesians have generated some result that pro-ratio Bayesians need to parry,
as is often thought (e.g., [Fitelson, 2002]). The ratio proponent is therefore
rationally free to present the ratio view as an attractive option. But merely
expressing one’s intuitions and inviting others to join in does usually not make
much progress in a longstanding debate. This paper invites the reader to recon-
sider intuitions indicating that there is any such problem, by displaying how well
the ratio measure fits the mathematics of Bayesianism mathematically, whereas
other measures are often motivated by an intuition (that irrelevant conjunctions
should not be confirmed) that is incompatible with Bayesianism. Furthermore,
1Of course one now knows that some swans are black, and it doesn’t matter how many
lions really are brave.
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confirmation measures that aren’t attuned to the mathematics of Bayes’ theo-
rem in the way that the ratio measure is, need not stay closely in step with the
changes in probabilities. This fact (not an independent intuition in favor of some
confirmation measure or of its numerical behavior in specific cases) seems to me
to be the proper import of the cases of “unintuitive confirmation” that have
been proposed in favor of the ratio measure [Schlesinger, 1995]. While there
is parity in the unintuitive confirmation arguments against and for the ratio
measure [Fitelson, 1999], the rootedness of the ratio measure in Bayes’ theorem
breaks the symmetry. Those are already reasons to favor the ratio measure.
This paper also proposes an example where the ratio measure behaves plau-
sibly, whereas the ideal of not confirming irrelevant conjunctions generates the
absurd result that present evidence doesn’t confirm theories about past events.
Bayesianism does not permit that absurd result, however, because it requires
irrelevant conjunctions to be confirmed to some degree. The weaker goal of
having irrelevant conjunctions confirmed less than the relevant conjunct has
the effect of making confirmation depend on the prior probability of the theory
in question, thus importing massive subjectivity into the degree of confirmation
for subjective Bayesians.
One thus has a number of reasons to favor the ratio measure and the related
view that there is no problem with confirming irrelevant conjuncts over (most)
alternative measures and the associated view that it is problematic for irrelevant
conjunctions to be confirmed:
1. The ratio measure is motivated by the mathematical form of Bayes’ the-
orem, whereas most of the competition is not.
2. Insofar as a measure of confirmation is not motivated by Bayes’ theorem,
there seems to be nothing to prevent confirmation from getting quite out
of line with the trend of the posterior probabilities, making confirmation
an idle wheel on the Bayesian machinery.
3. The view that irrelevant conjunctions should not be confirmed leads to
a formal profession of historical skepticism, according to which present
evidence doesn’t confirm claims about past events at all.
4. The view that irrelevant conjunctions should not be confirmed is incom-
patible with Bayesianism, forcing its proponents to settle for only partial
realization of their ideal.
5. That partial realization, that irrelevant conjunctions should be confirmed
noticeably less than the relevant conjunct, leads to a formal profession
of historical subjectivism, according to which present evidence confirms
claims about past events to a degree that might be low and that depends
strongly on one’s prior probability for the irrelevant conjunct.
Concerning historical skepticism or subjectivism, there might well be other rea-
sons for such views about the past in view of Hume’s induction skepticism
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[Howson, 2000]—real skepticism, not a formal profession of skepticism poten-
tially belied by high probability assignments, for example.2 But it is surprising
and undesirable for a principle of confirmation theory to imply or encourage
skepticism or subjectivism regarding confirmation of claims about the past.
Given that there isn’t really any problem of irrelevant conjunction, using
the ratio measure, it is useful to consider why many people think that there
is. It is suggested that one real problem in the neighborhood, which might
encourage faulty intuitions, is whether the irrelevant conjunct is confirmed. It
isn’t, whether using the ratio measure or some other. Another possible source of
confusion is the special consequence condition on confirmation, which Bayesians
must reject.
But not all is well for the ratio measure as the one true measure of confir-
mation in all contexts. Attention to which probabilities are epistemologically
primitive indicates that, for non-statistical hypotheses, Bayes’ theorem involves
not multiplying the prior probability by a number to get the posterior, but
acting on the prior with a fractional linear transformation with a parameter
involving the ratio of the likelihoods P (E|T ) and P (E|¬T ).
2 Irrelevance
What, mathematically speaking, is it for T2 to be irrelevant to T1 and to the
evidence E for or against T1? Given the vagueness of the problem of irrele-
vant conjunction in many discussions, it might be appropriate simply to read
off the irrelevance condition as whatever it takes to avoid confirming T2. But
one also has some intuitions about probabilistic irrelevance; one hopes that in-
tuitive expectations about probabilistic irrelevance and the condition needed to
avoid confirming T2 are similar. Concerning the intuitions about probabilis-
tic irrelevance of the irrelevant conjunct, this irrelevance should manifest itself
mathematically in probabilistic independence of the two theories:
P (T2|T1) = P (T2). (1)
2On the cultural significance of justifying induction, see Gerhard Schurz [Schurz, 2008].
Schurz’s justification of ordinary induction, which is meta-inductive in the tradition of Hans
Reichenbach, depends on our knowing that ordinary induction has worked better than any
alternative so far. However, it is unclear, in advance of justifying induction, how one knows
that ordinary induction has been more predictively successful that any rival method. Where
historical facts are absent or controversial (reconstructed from rival inductive methods), every
method judges itself successful [Burks, 1953]. If the past is not recalled perfectly and un-
controversially, then there is room for proponents of methods that disagree occasionally with
ordinary induction to claim that their methods have been most successful and hence justi-
fied instead of ordinary induction, especially if their methods align with allegedly historical
reports. Such methods are an example of the “asymptotic rules” that most seriously afflicted
Reichenbach’s justification of induction [Salmon, 1974]. They are also probably the only kind
of rival method that non-philosophers have ever entertained, providing the real competition
for ordinary induction in the intellectual history of the Enlightenment, for example.
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One would also expect T2 to be independent of the evidence for or against T1:
for all E such that P (E|T1) 6= P (E), one has
P (T2|E) = P (T2). (2)
One would expect T2 to be irrelevant not merely to T1 and to E, but also to
their conjunction:
P (T2|T1&E) = P (T2) (3)
for all such E. Is this condition independent?
One can show that this third condition is mathematically independent of the
other two. The following example (momentarily suspending talk of swan color
and lion courage) satisfies the first two independence conditions, violates the
third independence condition, and has E confirm T1. Consider an automotive
show with 16 cars: 6 fast blue Fords, two slow red Fords, 6 fast red Chevrolets,
and two slow blue Chevrolets. Let a car be chosen at random, and let T1 be
that the car is a Ford, E that it is blue, and T2 that it is fast. One then has
P (T2|T1) = P (fast|Ford) = 6/8 = P (T2) = P (fast) = 12/16,
P (T2|E) = P (fast|blue) = 6/8 = P (fast) = 12/16,
P (T2|T1&E) = P (fast|Ford&blue) = 6/6 6= P (T2) = P (fast) = 12/16,
P (T1|E) = P (Ford|blue) = 6/8 > P (T1) = P (Ford) = 1/2. (4)
Thus the irrelevance of the irrelevant conjunct needs to involve T2’s being inde-
pendent of T1, of E, and of T1&E. It is easy to show that P (T2|T1&¬E) = P (T2)
is not an independent condition; a precisely analogous calculation shows that
P (T2|¬T1&E) = P (T2) is also already implied. Likewise P (T2|¬T1&¬E) =
P (T2) is a consequence of the three independence conditions above.
3 The Ratio Measure
The ratio measure of confirmation (or something equivalent) has been
praised by some authors [Howson, 1983, Horwich, 1993, Schlesinger, 1995,
Milne, 1995, Milne, 1996, Kuipers, 2000] and criticized by others
[Rosenkrantz, 1983, Gillies, 1986, Fitelson, 2001, Eells and Fitelson, 2002,
Hawthorne and Fitelson, 2004, Crupi and Tentori, 2010]. In the former group,
Peter Milne is perhaps the most ambitious in claiming to prove that the (log)
ratio measure is the one true measure of Bayesian confirmation [Milne, 1996].
For Milne, the ratio measure (or rather its logarithm—there is no need here to
distinguish measures that are obviously equivalent in the sense of quantitative
interconvertibility) follows from an axiom about certain kinds of probabilistic
independence. The treatment is perhaps a bit quick for those who are
antecedently suspicious of the ratio measure and even those not antecedently
sympathetic toward it. Seeing that the ratio measure is uniquely appropriate in
dealing with the problem of irrelevant conjunction (at least among alternatives
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considered by Branden Fitelson) might help to motivate what Milne takes as
axiomatic.
If one defines confirmation using the ratio measure
r(T, E) =def
P (E|T )
P (E)
, (5)
which of course is equal to P(T |E)
P(T )
(apart from extreme cases—a qualification
that I will ignore most of the time, but see [Festa, 1999] and later in this section),
it turns out that evidence E for T1 is also evidence for the conjunction T1&T2 in
cases where T2 is irrelevant to T1 (and T2 is logically consistent with T1). Using
the independence condition P (T2|T1&E) = P (T2), one calculates that
P (T1&T2|E) = P (T2|T1&E)P (T1|E) = P (T2)P (T1|E), (6)
which is encouraging. The ratio measure becomes
r(T1&T2, E) =
P (E|T1&T2)
P (E)
=
P (T1&T2 |E)
P (T1&T2)
=
P (T2|T1&E)P (T1|E)
P (T2|T1)P (T1)
=
P (T2)P (T1|E)
P (T2)P (T1)
=
P (T1|E)
P (T1)
=
P (E|T1)
P (E)
= r(T1, E), (7)
making use of P (T2|T1&E) = P (T2) and P (T2|T1) = P (T2). While evidence E
that confirms T1 also confirms the conjunction T1&T2, it looks as though T2 is
merely going along for the ride, as an irrelevancy should.
To be sure that T2 is not getting confirmed by E, one of course ought to
consider the confirmation of T2 directly. Using the independence condition
P (T2|E) = P (T2), the ratio measure gives
r(T2, E) =
P (E|T2)
P (E)
=
P (T2|E)
P (T2)
= 1, (8)
the trivial value of no confirmation, so T2 is not confirmed by the evidence E
for T1. That is just what one hoped: one cannot become more confident that
all lions are brave by heaping up facts about the coloration of swans. This
particular feature does not distinguish the ratio measure from other measures,
admittedly. The point is simply that when one is concerned about what clearly
is a problem (the confirmation of the irrelevant conjunct), not what might not
be a problem at all (the confirmation of the irrelevant conjunction), the ratio
measure has no problem. It turns out that the three independence assumptions
that followed naturally above from the irrelevance of T2 precisely imply that
the irrelevant conjunct T2 is not confirmed by evidence E for T1 and that the
confirmation that E provides T1&T2 is wholly due to confirmation of T1. All is
as one might hope for the ratio measure.
The reader might notice that this little derivation exploits as a virtue a
phenomenon that Fitelson has viewed as a vice in his theorem 3 [Fitelson, 2001]
and substantially similar theorem 2 [Fitelson, 2002]. A fundamental issue here is
what the problem of irrelevant conjunction is, or ought to be. On that question,
Fitelson provides, in a transparent notation,
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Theorem 1. If E confirms H, and X is confirmationally irrelevant
to H, E, and H & E (relative to K), then E also confirms H & X
(relative to K). [Fitelson, 2002]
Many Bayesians would agree with his next remark:
I claim that this is the “problem of irrelevant conjunction”
that Bayesian confirmation theorists should be worrying about.
[Fitelson, 2002]
But why think that this fact expressed in his theorem 1 is a problem at all?
Some time ago Clark Glymour, who had in mind hypothetico-deductivism but
presumably would have made the same point against any Bayesianisms where
it applied, judged:
Nor are we greatly impressed by a theory of evidence which claims,
for instance, that the Stark effect confirms the conjunction of quan-
tum mechanics and the principle that the president of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints is infallible, all the while reas-
suring us that the Stark effect does not confirm the latter principle
alone. [Glymour, 1980, p. 31]
But why not? I, for one, do not at all mind getting that result from Bayesianism
with the ratio measure. Much as Milne proposed in addressing the tacking prob-
lem in the context of the (log) ratio measure, it makes sense here to embrace the
conclusion that has been proposed otherwise as a reductio [Milne, 1996]. Milne,
alas, stops short: having found that the irrelevant conjunction is confirmed to
the same degree as the relevant conjunct assuming P (E|T1) = P (E|T1&T2) (af-
ter translation into my notation and suppression of mention of the background
information), he notes only that one cannot infer anything about the degree
of confirmation of the irrelevant conjunct T2 by E. He does not explore fully
enough what the irrelevance of T2 means to show that it, the irrelevant conjunct,
is confirmed only to the trivial value (1 for the ratio measure, 0 for a log-ratio
measure), which is to say, not confirmed.
Confirming the irrelevant conjunction to the same degree as the relevant
conjunct and not confirming the irrelevant conjunct at all is a very plausible
way for an irrelevant conjunct merely to go along for the ride. For his part,
Glymour is unwilling to take a stand against the special consequence condition
[Glymour, 1980, pp. 31, 155], a fact that makes clear one reason why he would
embrace not the resolution proposed in this paper (besides his not being a
Bayesian). But Bayesians generally do reject the special consequence condition,
so they will need some other reason to reject this outcome as a flaw rather than
a result. Paul Horwich has made this point in a brief verbal form near the end of
his book, where he interacts with Glymour’s bootstrap account of confirmation,
which deliberately has the consequence that “neither evidence for p, nor even the
discovery of p, is sufficient to confirm the conjunction p∧ q.” [Horwich, 1982, p.
139] (see also [Horwich, 1983]). But is it desirable to avoid the conclusion that
an irrelevant conjunction is confirmed at least to some degree (even if perhaps
less than the relevant conjunct)? Horwich comments, pace Glymour, that
7
There are indeed times when T is confirmed, even though the evi-
dence is irrelevant to some part T ′ of T. But there is nothing in either
Bayesianism or the H-D method to suggest that T ′ should be given
any credit. Unless we were, mistakenly, to endorse the consequence
condition (criticised in Chapter 3), we would not conclude from the
fact that T entails T ′, that T ′ is supported by whatever confirms T.
[Horwich, 1982, pp. 140, 141]
Like Milne, Horwich has made room for the possibility that the irrelevant con-
junct is not confirmed, but has not presented probabilistic relations of inde-
pendence to show that such an attractive possibility is realized. The ongoing
reluctance of various other authors to take the ratio measure seriously as giving
an adequate, indeed a superior, treatment of the problem of irrelevant conjunc-
tion makes it appropriate to be explicit on this point.
Fitelson has made clear that an irrelevant conjunction is confirmed (accord-
ing to the ratio measure) as strongly as the relevant conjunct, but without
taking seriously the idea that a solution of the problem of irrelevant conjunc-
tion is thereby obtained. Evidently Horwich’s suggestion about what the real
problem is, has not made the impact that it deserved. Indeed this sort of
view does not even make an appearance in Fitelson’s survey of responses to
the problem of irrelevant conjunction [Fitelson, 2001]. Moreover, Fitelson has
regarded the ratio measure of confirmation as incapable of solving the problem
of irrelevant conjunction (see footnotes 28 and 36) [Fitelson, 2001, pp. 17, 21]
[Fitelson, 2002]. It is acknowledged as one possible move, though not one ap-
pealing to him, in a forthcoming work [Fitelson, 2011]; his calling it bullet-biting
suggests that its plausibility has not been recognized. Likewise David Atkin-
son holds that the problem of irrelevant conjunction, having appeared first for
hypothetico-deductivism and having been managed by some Bayesians, is “back
in full force” for the ratio measure [Atkinson, 2009]. The difficulty, I suggest, is
that what they regard as the problem of irrelevant conjunction (quoted above
just under Fitelson’s theorem 1), that the conjunction is confirmed, is not a
problem at all, but simply a result.
It seems that the two most plausible approaches to dealing with irrelevant
conjunctions are the extreme ones: either an irrelevant conjunction is not con-
firmed at all, as on Glymour’s view, because the irrelevant part has no eligible
place in the confirmation formalism, or an irrelevant conjunction is confirmed
to the same degree as the relevant conjunct, as on the ratio confirmation mea-
sure in Bayesianism, because the irrelevant conjunct makes no difference. If the
irrelevant conjunct is really irrelevant, then why should the conjunction be con-
firmed at all, but less well confirmed? Yet this seems to be the typical Bayesian
view nowadays [Earman, 1992, Fitelson, 2001, Hawthorne and Fitelson, 2004,
Crupi and Tentori, 2010]. Either ineligibility or irrelevance would seem to be
the natural options. This view appears to be in line with that of Patrick Maher
[Maher, 2004], but not that of Roger Rosenkrantz [Rosenkrantz, 1994]. Regard-
ing some deductive special cases, Rosenkrantz expects no confirmation (which
seems to mean that the degree of confirmation is defined and has a value of
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0) when T1 excludes T2, equal confirmation for T1&T2 and T1 when T1 → T2
(naturally), and linear interpolation between those endpoints. While those end-
point values are reasonable, they are not the only reasonable possibilities. For
the ratio measure, if T1 → T2, then
r(T1&T2 , E) =
P (E|T1&T2)
P (E)
=
P (E|T1)
P (E)
= r(T1, E) : (9)
not surprisingly, the degrees of confirmation of T1 and of T1&T2 agree. If instead
T1 → ¬T2, then
r(T1&T2, E)
?
=
P (E|T1&T2)
P (E)
, (10)
which is undefined due to conditionalizing on an impossible proposition. Re-
calling that
P (E|T )
P (E)
=
P (T |E)
P (T )
except in extreme cases, and finding difficulty in an extreme case here, one can
try again with
r(T1&T2, E)
?
=
P (T1&T2|E)
P (T1&T2)
=
0
0 ,
(11)
which is also undefined. Hence “no confirmation” can reasonably mean that
the degree of confirmation is undefined, rather than 0. Thus Rosenkrantz’s
linear interpolation between two finite endpoints, though displaying a sort of
mathematical simplicity, is somewhat arbitrary and not clearly better than the
ratio measure’s behavior, which does not invite simple interpolation.
As Maher notes, making the irrelevant conjunction be confirmed at all, but
less than the relevant conjunct, merely reduces the (supposed) problem without
eliminating it; he quotes Fitelson [Fitelson, 2002] about merely “soften[ing] the
impact” of the problem. But as Maher notes, “a solution that removed the
impact altogether would be better.” (He goes on to provide a different resolution
from the one proposed here.) Of the two ‘extreme’ views, the proposal that the
conjunction is not confirmed at all takes one out of the Bayesian realm, a drastic
move. Furthermore, what does one say about almost irrelevant conjunctions?
The obvious remaining candidate is that the conjunction is confirmed precisely
as much as the relevant conjunct is confirmed. Not only is Fitelson’s problem
(that the conjunction is confirmed) plausibly not a real problem, but a stronger
and ratio-motivated claim is also plausible: the conjunction is confirmed to the
same degree as the relevant conjunct. One would expect something irrelevant
to make no difference. What else should irrelevance mean? Regarding the
confirmation of an irrelevant conjunction, Theo Kuipers finds the behavior of
the ratio measure of confirmation “very plausible” [Kuipers, 2000, p. 55].
One should let the mathematics play a guiding role in framing the desiderata.
As Henry Finch put the matter quite a while ago [Finch, 1960]:
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Intuitions of adequacy have little force against the imperatives of sys-
tems whose usefulness and consequences extend beyond momentary
or locally plausible intuition.. . . Better by far than any “feeling” of
adequacy concerning a metrical concept is the finding that the con-
cept functions precisely and advantageously in a confirmed metrical
theory.
One can find mathematical examples such that, according to intuitions that
some people have, some measure or other besides the ratio measure seems more
satisfactory. But given the multiplicity of the competing intuitions and exam-
ples [Fitelson, 1999], it is difficult to take such examples very seriously. One
could perhaps take that cacophony as a reason not to define a quantitative
degree of confirmation at all; one could simply use the Bayesian machinery
without calling anything the “degree of confirmation,” an indifferentist position
[Howson, 2000] (c.f. [Steel, 2007]). The serious possibility of not defining any
degree of confirmation at all, and instead merely discussing the dynamics of pos-
terior probabilities in light of evidence, shows that any degree of confirmation
that isn’t rooted in Bayes’ theorem has little work to do.
If one of the many competing definitions of degree of confirmation is wor-
thy of the name, it should not only perform in accord with one’s intuitions in
some favorite cases, but also bear a close connection to Bayes’ theorem and the
typical conditionalization dynamics of degrees of belief (leaving aside more so-
phisticated cases requiring Jeffrey conditionalization or perhaps an alternative
objective updating scheme). It is not easy to accept the idea that in a quanti-
tative Bayesian confirmation theory involving some mathematical dynamics of
degrees of belief, the “degree of confirmation” is well defined but has little or
nothing to do with the dynamics of degrees of belief. Even a merely qualitative
agreement (which might suffice to blunt absurd results such as the historical
skepticism explained below) is a setback for a quantitative confirmation theory.
Surely confirmation is not merely something that happens simultaneously with
encountering new evidence and revising one’s degrees of belief accordingly, or
even some process that involves more than encountering new evidence and re-
vising one’s degrees of belief accordingly. Rather, confirmation is the process
that updating by Bayes’ theorem systematizes. The degree of confirmation is
either an informative gloss on the process of updating or an idle wheel. Bayes’
theorem strongly suggests that the most fruitful concept of confirmation around
which one might build a theory is incremental confirmation in a multiplicative
sense, or perhaps some more subtle transformation that can be read off the theo-
rem. By contrast the difference measure, for example, ignores the multiplicative
character of confirmation that Bayes’ theorem suggests.
The fact that T1&T2 is logically stronger than T1 should make no difference
in the degree of confirmation just because of the multiplicative character sug-
gested by Bayes’ theorem. Intuitions that the logically stronger T1&T2 (with T2
irrelevant) should be less confirmed by E than is T1, like the special consequence
condition, are far more plausible for absolute confirmation than for the incre-
mental confirmation at the heart of Bayesianism. Of course T1&T2 typically has
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lower prior and posterior probabilities than T1. Why is that not enough? The
ratio measure also has the feature [Steel, 2007], which seems advantageous, of
tying Bayesianism more closely to the likelihood principle.
It is useful to recall how the ratio measure behaves in special cases where
the relevant theory T1 entails the evidence E, or where T1 is inconsistent with
E. In the first case, T1 → E gives P (E|T1) = 1, so
r(T1, E) =
P (E|T1)
P (E)
=
1
P (E)
(12)
and (if also T2 is consistent with T1)
r(T1&T2 , E) =
P (E|T1&T2)
P (E)
=
1
P (E)
; (13)
whether the equality of these degrees of confirmation is appropriate is difficult
to say in isolation from a larger consideration of the issues. If instead T1 → ¬E,
falsification or something like it, then
r(T1, E) =
P (E|T1)
P (E)
=
0
P (E)
= 0 (14)
and, if T2 is consistent with T1,
r(T1&T2, E) =
P (E|T1&T2)
P (E)
=
0
P (E)
= 0; (15)
hence the 0 degree of ratio confirmation is a sign of falsification or something
close.
One might also comment on the symmetry between T and E in the ratio
measure.3 Is it peculiar that, one might say, E is confirmed by T just as much as
T is confirmed by E? Strictly speaking, that isn’t true: generally T and E play
different roles, so contexts where one can speak of (observed) E as confirming
T are generally not contexts where one can speak of (observed? known?) T as
confirming E. But it seems that, qualitatively speaking, it is appropriate that
if T makes (potential) evidence E look good by predicting it, then (observed) E
makes T look good by confirming it. What of the quantitative equality, however?
There seems to be nothing unreasonable about having the two amounts be equal.
The best reason for accepting equality is that it seems to be the lesson that the
Bayesian mathematics wishes to teach in the dynamics of the probabilities. But
perhaps one can say a bit more. If the two quantities should grow or shrink
together, presumably there should be some strictly increasing function relating
them. But it is not easy to think of a non-arbitrary reason for preferring one
strictly increasing function over another, apart from the identity f(x) = x. If
one were to think of T and E as both being theories, neither would confirm
the other, because neither would be evidence. But the symmetry between the
two theories would be welcome from the standpoint of at least some measures
of coherence [Shogenji, 1999, Schupbach, 2011]. Hence what might have seemed
peculiar is in fact beneficial.
3I thank an anonymous referee for posing an issue in this neighborhood.
11
4 Historical Skepticism, Subjectivism, or Con-
firmation of Irrelevant Conjunctions
The fact that the ratio measure of confirmation is suggested by Bayes’ theorem,
whereas most of the competition (such as taking a difference of two probabili-
ties) is not, is evident, but not really news. Likewise the fact that the ideal that
irrelevant conjunctions not be confirmed is incompatible with Bayesianism, is
not really news either. Such facts are underappreciated and hence worth reiter-
ating, but it would be ideal to show some plainly absurd consequence as a novel
reductio ad absurdum of the cluster of views opposing the ratio measure.
One can imagine learning about the past (beyond living memory) by in-
ferring from present physical traces, or from testimonial evidence in old texts
presumably rooted in eyewitness testimony, or both. As long as there is no
conflict, there is no pressing worry, but what if they do conflict? In the 18th
century it was much disputed how the two sorts of evidence ought to be used in
reconstructing the geological past [Rappaport, 1997]. The modern view (as in
Buffon), displaying a non-Humean confidence in induction [Sloan, 1985] and a
rationalistic increased willingness to reject testimonial evidence for preternatu-
ral events, tipped the balance towards physical traces over testimonial evidence,
in general, in cases of conflict.
However that may be, the ideal that irrelevant conjunctions should not be
confirmed would, if taken seriously, lead to a swift overthrow of all confirmation
of claims about the past, based on current physical traces. Let theory T1 be
some claim about the how the past appears to have been, judging by present
physical traces. For example, one can take T1 to be the claim that the Earth
appears to be 4.5 billion years old. Let E be appropriate facts about rock strata,
radiometric dating, etc. Let T2 be the claim that the Earth really is whatever age
it appears to be, an hypothesis of inductive historical realism. Such a principle,
despite being widely believed with considerable firmness, seems untestable and,
a positivist might say, metaphysical. What matters for present purposes is that
T2 is an irrelevant conjunct, or very nearly so. Do we have
P (T2|T1) = P (T2),
P (T2|E) = P (T2),
P (T2|T1&E) = P (T2) (16)
for all E bearing on T1? It seems so.. . .
4 T2 doesn’t care if T1 involves an
apparent age of 4.5 billion years, 6014 years, eternity, 5 minutes, or some other
4. . . at least to a very good approximation using most contemporary scholars’ priors. In
calling T2 “metaphysical,” one could also deploy a related positivist bugbear, “theological,”
to T2, or at any rate to ¬T2. The only reason for doubting the independence conditions that
comes to mind, apart from Cartesian evil demons and the like, comes from early modern his-
tory of science: if someone were to take seriously Descartes’ justification for pretending that
the world had formed naturalistically out of chaos as making it easier to do natural philoso-
phy than if one tried to discern how God really created it in mature form [Descartes, 1985,
p. 256] (to which the “virtual individuals” gloss on the term representing the influence of
preconceived ideas in a Carnapian continuum of inductive methods [Jeffrey, 1980, pp. 2, 3] is
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value. Neither does T2 care about the specific facts about rock layers, radio-
metric dating, potsherds from an ancient city, bubble gum stuck to a school
desk, or the like. It is often enough recognized that historical antirealism ¬T2 is
untestable and idle for practical purposes [Gould, 1985, Brush, 1982]. But so is
inductive historical realism T2, as is rarely noticed except in discussions of the
verificationist criterion of meaning [Peirce, 1934, 5.597, p. 417] [Russell, 1948,
pp. 445-447] [Ayer, 1952, pp. 101, 102] [Hempel, 1959]. The lack of temporal
action at a distance (to borrow a phrase from Elliott Sober) makes the remote
past accessible only via the more recent past. Here is one positivist vs. realist
dispute that Bayesianism does not resolve (c.f. [Dorling, 1992]).
Now let us deploy the intuition that irrelevant conjunctions should not re-
ceive any confirmation. Ideally the rocks would provide no evidence at all for
T1&T2, that the Earth looks 4.5 billion years old and is as old as it looks. But
that view is logically equivalent to the usual geological view, presumably shared
by most non-ratio Bayesians at the moment, that the Earth looks and is 4.5 bil-
lion years old. If such non-ratio Bayesians had their way, the rocks, or rather,
facts E about them, would provide little or no confirmation for the usual geo-
logical view about the age of the Earth, simply as a consequence of confirmation
theory. The same would hold, naturally, for any structurally similar argument,
not necessarily pertaining to prehistoric events. One could perhaps make a simi-
lar move regarding testimonial evidence. This is a novel and implausible path to
historical skepticism. It even casts doubt on the value of both sorts of evidence
about the past, as opposed to shifting the balance from one side to the other.
This historical skepticism, fortunately, is a paper tiger. That is because con-
firmation, insofar as its mathematical form is not motivated by Bayes’ theorem,
is an idle wheel on the Bayesian machinery of the dynamics of numerical degrees
of belief in light of evidence. Most non-ratio measures, by virtue of not being
motivated by Bayes’ theorem, might yield the verdict that the conjunction that
the Earth looks 4.5 billion years old and that it is the same age that it looks,
is only weakly confirmed by the geological evidence—they will do so insofar
as they successfully implement the motivating ideal of avoiding confirming ir-
relevant conjunctions. But this result is largely verbal, because the Bayesian
analogous), or the anti-rationalist hypothesis of 18th century Catholics like the Jesuit Father
Castel [Ellenberger and Carozzi, 1999, pp. 45, 46, 141] (according to whom Noah’s Flood was
a miracle and ought not to be explained naturally, so that those who try to do so incur the
divine chastisement of bad physics), or Leibniz’s view that it was for the best that God did
not create the world with a longer past [Alexander, 1956, p. 76], or the like. Leibniz’s quoting
Horace about joining to a human head a horse’s neck leaves one to guess the meaning of the
analogy, but Leibniz’s idea of maximizing variety and simplicity [Blumenfeld, 1995] might be
intended. The lower the probability assigned to such ideas, the better the approximation of
irrelevance is for T2.
Bayesianism, fortunately, does not suffer the burden of dividing hypotheses into those that
aren’t really theories and those that are genuine theories [Kukla, 1998, Kukla, 2001] (c.f.
[Laudan and Leplin, 1991, Hoefer and Rosenberg, 1994]). One can simply punish hypotheses
that strike one as deficient or absurd with low priors. The resulting account is more unified
than are demarcationist approaches. It also leaves room for disagreement about which theories
are worth taking seriously. That bit of flexibility improves the prospects that Bayesianism
will be useful in the history of science.
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machinery runs precisely as if one were using the ratio measure, or as if one
used no measure of confirmation at all. One might have a high degree of belief
in T2 and have T1&T2 receive a high posterior probability due to E, but still
T1&T2 would be described as only slightly confirmed by E, while even that mod-
est degree of confirmation would be admitted grudgingly. But whether or not
one announces “the hypothesis is highly confirmed!” on receipt of E, the main
thing that matters is the trend of the posterior probabilities as evidence rolls
in. The typical non-ratio proponent is thus faced with the confusing prospect
of, perhaps, discerning only weak confirmation while simultaneously watching
posterior probabilities rise and become high for certain historical claims. (At
least it isn’t clear why that cannot happen, and it ought to happen, given the
principle of avoiding confirming irrelevant conjunctions.) If the intuitions about
confirmation of irrelevant conjunctions of most non-ratio proponents were to
have teeth, it would be necessary to have an appropriately matching alternative
scheme for updating probabilities.
Does the mediating position, that irrelevant conjunctions ought to be con-
firmed, but confirmed less than the relevant conjunct, escape trouble? In fact it
falls into subjectivism about confirmation. Consider Rosenkrantz’s confirmation
measure (with some change in notation and suppression of background knowl-
edge), using independence conditions due to the irrelevance of T2 as needed:
dc(T1&T2, E) = P (T1&T2|E)− P (T1&T2)
= P (T2|T1&E)P (T1|E)− P (T2|T1)P (T1) = P (T2)[P (T1|E)− P (T1)]
= P (T2)dc(T1, E). (17)
For people who find T2 highly plausible, the irrelevant conjunction is confirmed
almost as much as the relevant conjunct—no skepticism there. But what if
someone, perhaps a taxpaying voting American citizen interested in public ed-
ucation, or perhaps some historical figure who reasoned like Descartes or like
Castel, happens to find T2 doubtful? At least for subjective Bayesians, intuitive
judgments that doubting T2 is unreasonable, are inadmissible. People simply
have prior probabilities, and one set is as good as another as long as it isn’t
dogmatic (setting 0 probability on unrefuted contingent claims) and satisfies the
probability calculus. According to the subjective Bayesian,
There ain’t no good guy,
There ain’t no bad guy,
There’s only you and me and we just disagree.5
One could imagine, for example, someone’s doubting T2 but accepting its re-
striction to events after 4004 BC, thereby avoiding skepticism about recorded
history (or one stream thereof); that seems to have been roughly Descartes’
professed view. Induction is not infrequently justified in terms of just getting
by in the world. Consider John Kemeny’s conclusion:
5[sic], Billy Dean, “We Just Disagree.”
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In short, induction cannot be justified. We can only base it on
a more or less plausible sounding assumption [involving something
like a uniformity of nature claim]. . . . Only in one sense can we
justify induction. While our assumption must be taken on faith, we
can point out that unless some such assumption were true human
life would be impossible. If nature were designed so that plausible
inductions invariably turn out to be wrong, the human race would
be wiped out soon. [Kemeny, 1959, p. 121]
But absent a time machine, no one needs to get by in the past, still less in the
remote pre-human past. Reichenbach’s emphasis on successful prediction has a
similar practical aspect, as well as a noteworthy past-future asymmetry reflect-
ing the lack of need to get by in the past [Reichenbach, 1938]. No direct practical
disadvantage ensues from accepting only the temporally restricted variant of T2.
Then the degree of confirmation for claims about the past prior to 4004 BC, for
someone accepting only the temporally restricted relative of T2, suffers due to
the smallness of P (T2). One cannot say that claims about the past are objec-
tively well confirmed; one cannot even say that they are intersubjectively well
confirmed without an informal survey of people’s degrees of belief in T2. That
is rather embarrassing for a view of confirmation that renounces the system-
atic elegance of the ratio measure in order to achieve better fit with certain key
intuitions.
By contrast, let us deploy the ratio party’s view: there is no problem of
irrelevant conjunction, because irrelevant conjunctions are confirmed, indeed
(incrementally) confirmed to the same degree as the relevant conjunct, and that
is a result rather than a problem. Thus T1&T2 benefits from E by having
its probability suitably multiplied in accord with Bayesian conditionalization,
just as T1 does. T1&T2 does not suffer some unspecified and ideally enormous,
infinite or subjective penalty for the irrelevance of T2. Then the rock layers
really do provide the same degree of confirmation that the Earth looks and is
4.5 billion years old as that it looks 4.5 billion years old—in the technical sense
of incremental confirmation by having the prior probability suitably multiplied
in accord with Bayes’ theorem. T2 goes along for the ride, so someone who
assigns it a high probability can be confident about historical claims based
on present traces, and can also say that they are well confirmed. Judgments
of confirmation and multiplicative updates in posterior probabilities remain in
harmony. The subjectivity of the prior P (T2) does not disappear—that would
require solving Hume’s problem of induction [Howson, 2000] and hence is too
much to expect of a confirmation theory—but at least it isn’t imported into
judgments of confirmation. Avoiding a curious sort of historical skepticism or
subjectivism is an advantage for the ratio measure and the view that irrelevant
conjunctions should be confirmed accordingly.
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5 Why Has Confirming Irrelevant Conjunctions
Seemed Problematic?
Given that there is no problem of irrelevant conjunction, why have many people
thought that there was? It is not always easy, and not necessary, to give a fully
satisfactory explanation for why some people have certain faulty intuitions, once
the faultiness is shown. But two possible contributing factors might be lingering
worries of taint from the irrelevant conjunct as somehow secretly benefiting from
evidence for the relevant conjunct, and failure to repudiate clearly the special
consequence condition.
It seems plausible that one’s view on the confirmation of conjunctions should
be derived from two principles: it should be suggested by an adequate confirma-
tion theory, if possible, and it should ensure that the irrelevant conjunct receives
no confirmation. I, for one, can hardly imagine having a strong basic intuition
about how irrelevant conjunctions ought to fare in confirmation theory. That
seems not a lot more appropriate than having a strong basic intuition that in
differential calculus, the derivative of the product ought to take some definite
form; the most plausible wrong example, perhaps, is that the derivative of the
product be the product of the derivatives. There is some initial plausibility (evi-
dently attracting Leibniz himself for a short time [Child, 1920, Cupillari, 2004]),
and the proposal is correct for certain examples (though one isn’t likely to find
them without looking for them), but it is easily seen to be inconsistent with the
basic principles of calculus and incorrect for simple examples, such as having
one function constant; one could also mention dimensional incorrectness, if the
independent variable is not dimensionless. The view that there is a problem of
irrelevant conjunction fares only somewhat better: its definition of confirmation
is not motivated by Bayes’ theorem despite the existence of a measure that is
so motivated, judgments of confirmation can get somewhat out of line with the
trajectory of posterior probabilities, the intuition that irrelevant conjunctions
should not be confirmed is incompatible with Bayesianism and so is only imper-
fectly realized at best, the view yields a curious form of historical skepticism if
fully realized, and the view leads to subjectivism about confirmation if partly
realized.
The only real problem in the neighborhood of irrelevant conjunction, then,
would seem to be whether the irrelevant conjunct is confirmed. It would indeed
be disastrous if one could get confirmation for the infallibility for the Mormon
president by doing experiments on the Stark effect, to recall Glymour’s example,
or if one could learn about lion courage by checking swan coloration. It is
of the utmost importance not to confuse confirmation of the conjunction with
confirmation of the irrelevant conjunct. Rarely is such confusion explicitly made,
to be sure. But one can find evidence of occasional wavering. Consider John
Norton on an irrelevant conjunction example related to the one deployed above:
Consider a revisionist geology in which the world is supposed created
in exactly 4004 BC complete with its fossil record. Standard and
revisionist geologies have the same observational consequences, but
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surely we do not think that the fossil record confirms a creation in
4004 BC just as strongly as the ancient earth of standard geology.
[Norton, 2008, p. 28]6
But the tempting view (from the standpoint of some confirmation theories)
in question is not that the irrelevant conjunct (creation in 4004 BC) is as well
confirmed as the view that the world is old, or as well confirmed as the view that
the world is old and looks old (logically equivalent to an irrelevant conjunction,
as noted above). The tempting view is that the irrelevant conjunction is as well
confirmed as the relevant conjunct, and hence as well confirmed as irrelevant
conjunctions with other irrelevant conjuncts. Eagerness to keep the irrelevant
conjunct from being confirmed seems to have encouraged momentary confusion
of the irrelevant conjunct and the irrelevant conjunction. Perhaps less manifest
confusion operates elsewhere. For example, to the extent that I can make sense
of Glymour’s worry, fear of science’s being secretly tainted by Mormonism might
be in view. One generally doesn’t speak of “reassur[ance]” in the absence of prior
doubt. But there is no doubt here: that the irrelevant conjunct is not confirmed
is a very simple mathematical theorem.
Especially if one has tacitly retained from the older deductive confirmation
theories Hempel’s special consequence condition [Hempel, 1965, p. 31], one
might be tempted to think that the confirmation of T1&T2 implies confirma-
tion of T2. T2 is clearly a deductive consequence of T1&T2 , and the special
consequence condition implies that an observation that confirms a given sen-
tence also confirms any deductive consequence of that sentence. The special
consequence condition is plausible for confirmation viewed as firmness (having
a high probability), but not for the now-standard sense of confirmation as incre-
mental increase in firmness (raising the probability). The special consequence
condition is neither an axiom nor a theorem of Bayesian confirmation theory,
which primarily addresses incremental confirmation. (One can try to capture
the idea of firmness in terms of acceptance rules [Swain, 1970], for example, if it
seems advisable.) The special consequence condition in fact conflicts with the
relevance criterion of confirmation, to the effect that evidence confirms a theory
(given background knowledge) iff the theory makes the evidence more probable
than it would otherwise be [Mackie, 1969], as well as with Carnap’s measure of
confirmation [Carnap, 1962, p. 474]. So there is room to hope that Bayesian
confirmation of T1&T2 by confirming instances of T1 has no confirmatory effect
on an irrelevant claim T2. Indeed that follows from the mathematics, as noted
above.
To sum up, the real problem in the neighborhood, the threat of confirming
the irrelevant conjunct, does not happen for the ratio measure (or its rivals,
for that matter). The supposedly problematic fact, that the conjunction is
6The assumption here seems to be that creation in 4004 BC is an irrelevant conjunct. In
fact it isn’t irrelevant; the probability of creation in 4004 BC, given the geological evidence, is
famously lower than the prior probability of creation in 4004 BC. P (T2|E) 6= P (T2). I believe
that my treatment above finds the appropriate irrelevant conjunct in taking T2 to be inductive
historical realism, or perhaps its denial or the like.
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confirmed, is true but not problematic; at least no good reason to think it prob-
lematic has been provided, while such reasons as have been presented generate
an incredible (though toothless) historical skepticism. Typical Bayesian resolu-
tions, which hold that the conjunction is confirmed, but less than the relevant
conjunct, are implausible, apparently even to their own proponents (in view
of Fitelson’s remark about softening the impact [Fitelson, 2002]), and imply
(toothless) historical subjectivism about confirmation. By contrast the ratio
measure implies that the irrelevant conjunction is confirmed to the same degree
as the relevant conjunct, with the irrelevant conjunction getting no confirma-
tion; viewed from the appropriate angle, such results are very natural indeed.
Thus the ratio measure has, regarding irrelevant conjunction, advantages but
not disadvantages relative to most other measures.
6 Problem of Measure Sensitivity?
Such a resolution of the problem of irrelevant conjunction is so perspicuous and
reasonable as to suggest that distinctive or unusual features of the ratio measure
of confirmation ought to be reconsidered. Fitelson’s theorem 3 [Fitelson, 2001],
that the conjunction is confirmed less than the relevant conjunct for all con-
sidered measures except the ratio measure, I suggest, is a virtue of the ratio
measure and hence a clue for addressing his problem of measure sensitivity.
I propose applying modus ponens rather than Fitelson’s modus tollens to the
consequences of choosing the ratio measure. Plausibly, when one finds oneself
entertaining an inconsistent belief set, one wants to give up the belief with the
least epistemic importance [Ga¨rdenfors, 1984]. In view of the attractions of the
ratio measure and the historical skeptical problem for most of the competition,
it is appropriate to accept the ratio measure’s consequences.
Other distinctive features of r might perhaps be regarded as surprising
insights into confirmation, or perhaps a reminder that it is sometimes dif-
ficult to make an unambiguous translation of an intuition into a formula
[Kuipers, 2000]—which is precisely what is required in order to evaluate a mea-
sure of confirmation by its performance in relation to certain supposed desider-
ata. Recalling that P (¬T ) = 1−P (T ) as a result of the probability calculus, one
should use this identity, and not some independent and somewhat arbitrary in-
tuition, to infer connections between confirmation involving T and confirmation
involving ¬T, for example. In that case the ratio measure’s failure to satisfy
a certain negation symmetry between T and ¬T [Fitelson, 2001, Theorem 7,
pp. 40, 41] and a related symmetry proposed by Ellery Eells and Fitelson
[Eells and Fitelson, 2002] is not worrisome; one ought to derive the behavior
under negation from a definition of confirmation and the probability calculus,
rather than independently guessing it. Having adopted a highly mathematical
notion of degrees of belief and their updating in terms of Bayes’ theorem, it is
prudent to take the mathematics more seriously than is often done as a guide in
defining the degree of confirmation, whether or not one is satisfied with existing
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mathematical arguments such as Milne’s.7 Perhaps Bayes’ theorem also sug-
gests its own notion of confirmation, namely, one directly employed in its “refute
and rescale” [Norton, 2007] conditionalization dynamics, the ratio measure (or
something equivalent thereto) [Howson, 1983]? Thus Fitelson’s problem of mea-
sure sensitivity might be an artifact of not recognizing the preferred behavior
of the ratio measure.
7 Bayes’ Theorem as a Fractional Linear Trans-
formation in P (T ) for Hypotheses
It would be too facile, however, to claim that a surprisingly appropriate treat-
ment of the problem of irrelevant conjunction, combined with deeply problem-
atic results given other measures, provided a decisive reason to take the ratio
measure of confirmation to be the one true measure of confirmation in all con-
texts. That would take either a compelling argument from highly plausible
principles, such as Milne aimed to provide, or a weighing of all relevant consid-
erations. Perhaps the idea of a “degree of confirmation” is less meaningful than
has often been assumed.
A closer look at Bayes’ theorem for hypotheses suggests that the func-
tional dependence of the posterior probability on the prior is not always the
same. In contexts where P (E) is not a primitive entity derived from statistical
data, but is inferred using the (objective) likelihood P (E|T ) and the likeli-
hood P (E|¬T ) (on which more in a moment), there is also the (subjective)
taint of P (T ), using the theorem of total probability, in the denominator of
P(E|T )
P(E) : P (E) = P (E|T )P (T ) + P (E|¬T )P (¬T ) [Good, 1968, Edwards, 1972,
Howson and Urbach, 1993, Royall, 1997, Sober, 2002]. Thus the charming ob-
jective linear rescaling of the subjective P (T ) as the conditionalization dynamics
is illusory in such cases. Instead the result is a fractional linear transformation
with P (T ) as the variable:
P (T |E) =
P (E|T )
P (E|T )P (T ) + P (E|¬T )(1− P (T ))
P (T ) =
P (E|T )P (T )
[P (E|T )− P (E|¬T )]P (T )+ P (E|¬T ) .
(18)
7An analogy to recent progress in understanding the conservation and localization of grav-
itational energy in General Relativity comes to mind: by rejecting more or less ad hoc criteria
of adequacy and trusting the mathematics to suggest its own interpretation, a protracted and
otherwise perhaps insoluble controversy is resolved [Pitts, 2010]. In that context a contro-
versy dating to Schro¨dinger vs. Einstein in 1918 is resolved by taking seriously the relevant
calculations performed no later than 1958 [Bergmann, 1958], once inappropriate separately
postulated criteria are rejected. The main casualty is the universal tacit assumption of there
being One True Energy, of which every particular expression should be interrelated by a trans-
formation law. Instead there are infinitely many energies, as one might expect from Noether’s
first theorem in the presence of infinitelymany inequivalent time translation symmetries of the
laws. One would not expect inequivalent symmetries to yield equivalent conserved quantities.
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The choice of primitive quantities is guided by the assumption that one wishes
to focus attention as much as possible on T , referring to the competition only in-
sofar as the Bayesian formalism requires. A fractional linear transformation is a
function of the form f(x) = ax+b
cx+d , with ad−bc 6= 0 [Churchill and Brown, 1990].
Although such transformations are often encountered in complex analysis, in
the present context the variable x, being P (T ), must be real and take values
in the interval [0, 1] (or perhaps the open interval (0, 1) if T is contingent and
a non-dogmatism condition is being enforced). Bayes’ theorem enforces b = 0 :
dogmatic rejection of T is never overcome by Bayesian updating. One can make
the remaining identifications:
a = P (E|T ),
c = P (E|T )− P (E|¬T ),
d = P (E|¬T ). (19)
It is clear from the right side of these identifications that only two probabilities
determine the three coefficients a, c and d. In particular, c = a − d, so one
has f(x) = ax(a−d)x+d . But two parameters are still one too many, if one doesn’t
mind extending the positive real numbers by attaching +∞ (much as is done in
complex analysis), because one can divide the numerator and the denominator
by either a or d and leave only one parameter. The case d ≡ P (E|¬T ) = 0
is roughly falsification of ¬T and hence verification of T. In order to have a
parameter that takes the value of +∞ for verification of T (to be as similar to
the ratio measure as possible), one can divide the numerator and denominator
by d:
f(x) =
a
d
x
(a
d
− 1)x+ 1
, (20)
or, in terms of more probabilistically meaningful variables,
P (T |E) =
P(E|T )
P(E|¬T )
P (T )[
P(E|T )
P(E|¬T )
− 1
]
P (T ) + 1
. (21)
The single parameter a
d
=
P(E|T )
P(E|¬T ) lies in the range [0,+∞]. The figure illus-
trates the behavior of this function.
As with the ratio measure, there is a parameter related to confirmation
that involves the ratio of two probabilities, and its values run from 0 for (near)
falsification of T to +∞ for (near) proof of T. But the ratio in question is
P(E|T )
P(E|¬T ) (as also in [Good, 1984]), not
P(E|T )
P(E) , and it produces P (T |E) by acting
on P (T ) in a fashion more complicated than multiplication. Above I argued
that a “measure of confirmation” that doesn’t keep track of what evidence
does to P (T ) by Bayes’ theorem is a measure that plays little or no useful
role. The ratio measure does not have that problem, unlike the competition
discussed in debates about the ordinal equivalence or inequivalence of various
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Figure 1: P (T |E) as function of 0 ≤ P (T ) ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ P (E|T )/P (E|¬T ) ≤∞,
truncated at 23; done with Mathematica.
measures of confirmation [Fitelson, 1999, Atkinson, 2009]. But if confirmation
is a transformation that evidence performs on P (T ) to give P (T |E) by Bayes’
theorem, as I propose, then one must be prepared to disentangle the roles of
evidence and the prior probability in P (E) in some contexts.
If priors such as P (T ) are subjective, then one encounters the further fact
that, perhaps disappointingly, P (E|¬T ) is itself partly subjective and depends
on the priors for a set of mutually exclusive alternatives whose disjunction is
¬T [Good, 1968, Royall, 1997], tainting coefficients c = a − d and d. Letting
hypotheses T1, . . . Tn form, with T , a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive
alternatives, one has
P (E|¬T ) =
n∑
i=1
P (E|Ti)
P (Ti)
1− P (T )
. (22)
One can take P (T ) and n − 1 of the fractions P(Ti)
1−P(T )
as independent, in view
of the requirement that P (T )+
∑n
i=1 P (Ti) = 1. P (E|¬T ) thus is an average of
n objective likelihoods P (E|Ti) weighted by n − 1 subjective ratios of degrees
of belief. If one wishes to focus attention on T as far as possible, then bundling
all the extraneous likelihoods and priors into P (E|¬T ) can be convenient. Like-
lihoodists [Royall, 1997] might think that a “degree of confirmation” for T by
E dependent on (among other things) n − 1 independent subjective degrees of
belief in theories besides T, is not worth the trouble, or not worthy to be called
scientific. I do not wish here to dispute about the word “scientific.” But as
human beings, if perhaps not as scientists, often we do have degrees of belief
in theories, and the appeal of constructing a world view, even a partly subjec-
tive one, makes it seem worthwhile to retain degrees of belief and a measure of
confirmation, while frankly admitting the subjectivity of some of its ingredients.
One can consider the problem of irrelevant conjunction while viewing con-
firmation as a fractional linear transformation (broadly construed so as to
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admit degenerate cases). The quick and easy way to the answer is this:
P (T1&T2|E) = P (T1|E)P (T2|T1&E) = P (T1|E)P (T2) using the independence
condition P (T2|T1&E) = P (T2). One can then expand out the fractional linear
transformation involving P (T1) as above, while for P (T2) the transformation is
just the identity, as one might hope. Thus for the T2 transformation, c = 0 and
a = d. The fractional linear transformation for P (T1&T2) factors into one for
P (T1) and the identity transformation 1 · P (T2), much like the ratio measure
factored above.
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